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THE PROPHYLACTIC FIFTH AMENDMENT 
TRACEY MACLIN∗ 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: So beating a prisoner to compel a—a statement is 
not a Fifth Amendment violation. 
DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL PAUL CLEMENT: That’s right, 
Justice Kennedy. It’s not a Fifth Amendment violation. . . . 
. . . . 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: What about the order of a trial judge in a civil case 
who orders the witness held in contempt and confined unless he testifies, 
and—and there’s a valid Fifth Amendment privilege that the judge is 
overlooking? No Fifth Amendment violation there? 
CLEMENT: No. I don’t think there’s a Fifth Amendment—I don’t think 
there’s a complete Fifth Amendment violation. The courts intervene there 
to protect the privilege.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The right guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause 
appears straightforward: no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself.”2 Despite its basic terms, historical pedigree, and 
well-known status as a constitutional right, the public’s understanding of what 
is protected by the Fifth Amendment is often ill informed, and even sophisticated 
lawyers are not always capable of explaining the scope and application of the 
 
∗ Professor of Law, Joseph Lipsitt Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University School of 
Law. Thanks to Al Alschuler for his comments after reading a draft of this Article. And thanks 
to Maria Savarese and Christian Garcia for their excellent research and editing skills. 
1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 18-19, Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (No. 01-
1444).  
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V. While the Court, over a century ago, described the words of the 
Self-Incrimination Clause as “concise[],” Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 548 (1897), 
and “generic,” id. at 543, one student of the provision has rightly noted that application of the 
clause “can be deceptively complex,” STEVEN M. SALKY, THE PRIVILEGE OF SILENCE: FIFTH 
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, at ix (2009); cf. ALAN M. 
DERSHOWITZ, IS THERE A RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT? COERCIVE INTERROGATION AND THE 
FIFTH AMENDMENT AFTER 9/11, at 28-29 (2008) (noting that some of the amendment’s terms 
“are relatively simple to interpret,” while other parts of the provision are subject to differing 
meanings). 
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right.3 Indeed, supporters of the right not “to be a witness against [one]self”4 
have not been particularly adept at explaining why America needs the Fifth 
Amendment.5 This uncertainty about the scope of the privilege, as well as the 
inability to persuasively defend it, may be due to the fact that many Americans 
do not consider the Fifth Amendment one of the “respectable freedoms”—like 
the right to freedom of speech or freedom of religion.6 Too many people 
 
3 The best example of the public’s misunderstanding of the Fifth Amendment is the view 
that persons enjoy a “right to remain silent” when questioned by police. As explained in a 
recent article, Americans’ understanding of what the Fifth Amendment protects is deeply 
flawed. See Tracey Maclin, The Right to Silence v. The Fifth Amendment, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 255, 260-63 (explaining why the Supreme Court’s rulings in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 
760 (2003), Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010), and Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 
2174 (2013), show that the Fifth Amendment does not protect all persons during their 
interactions with police and does not always protect silence). 
4 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Judges and lawyers often refer to the right embodied in the Fifth 
Amendment as the “privilege” against compelled self-incrimination. See, e.g., Mitchell v. 
United States, 526 U.S. 314, 316 (1999). As Leonard Levy rightly notes, this characterization 
is unfortunate. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, at xv (2d ed. 1986) 
(explaining that “[a]lthough the right against self-incrimination originated in England as a 
common-law privilege, the Fifth Amendment made it a constitutional right, clothing it with 
the same status as other rights, like freedom of religion, that we would never denigrate by 
describing them as mere privileges”); id. at xvi (“The right or ‘privilege’ against self-
incrimination was not a phrase known to the framers of the Fifth Amendment. They spoke 
more broadly of the right of a person not to be a witness against himself. The first state bill of 
rights spoke of one’s right not to be compelled to give evidence against himself.”). 
Nonetheless, throughout this Article I will use the term “privilege” to describe the right 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.   
5 See, e.g., ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955) (“A good many 
efforts have been made to rationalize the privilege, to explain why it is a desirable or essential 
part of our basic law. None of the explanations is wholly satisfactory.”); David Dolinko, Is 
There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1147 
(1986) (arguing that contemporary efforts to justify the privilege are unconvincing, and stating 
that the privilege “can be explained by specific historical developments, but cannot be 
justified either functionally or conceptually” (footnote omitted)); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some 
Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 320 (1991) 
(“In spite of the many Supreme Court opinions that laud the privilege in reverential terms, the 
precise purpose it serves has never been adequately explained or defended.”); Mickey Kaus, 
The Fifth Is Now Obsolete, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1986, at A19 (arguing that there is no 
persuasive justification for the privilege, and that the amendment’s original purpose to protect 
religious and political freedoms can be served “by other, far less destructive, constitutional 
rules”). 
6 LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 19 (1983) (“Americans have always 
been quick to defend what are considered the respectable freedoms: press, religion, assembly. 
But those accused of crime have had few defenders. Few men have rushed to uphold the 
constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure or against compelled self-
incrimination when it was a kilo of heroin that was seized or a confession forced from a father 
accused of bludgeoning his daughter to death.”). 
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associate the Fifth Amendment with criminals, and believe that only guilty 
individuals invoke the Fifth.7 
On the other hand, despite some misunderstanding about the constitutional 
nuances of the Fifth Amendment, informed citizens realize that the privilege bars 
law enforcement officers from using coercion to compel an incriminating 
statement from a suspect. As some have observed, “[t]he heyday of what came 
to be known in American culture as the ‘third degree’—the infliction of physical 
pain or mental suffering to obtain information about a crime—was the first third 
of the twentieth century.”8 Despite what police officials said or thought about 
the third degree in the 1930s,9 the use of coercion, whether physical or 
psychological, was (and still is) condemned by most Americans.10 And, if a legal 
basis were needed to support condemnation of police coercion to obtain 
incriminating statements, many folks would point to the Fifth Amendment’s 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 
 
7 See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956) (“Too many, even those who 
should be better advised, view th[e] privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily 
assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the 
privilege.”); LEVY, supra note 4, at vii (acknowledging the public perception that when 
someone invokes the Fifth Amendment, the person “seems to be saying that he has something 
to hide, making the Fifth Amendment appear to be a protection of the guilty,” and observing 
that “[w]ithout doubt the right against self-incrimination is the most misunderstood, 
unrespected, and controversial of all rights”); Robert B. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the 
New Privacy, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 193 (“The persistent inability of courts and scholars to 
dispel the doubts surrounding the privilege is attributable to the ambivalence of most 
Americans—including the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States—when they 
think of the privilege. . . . [M]any are reluctant to accept the logical consequences of a 
generous interpretation of the privilege, particularly in view of the shelter it affords the guilty 
and the nonconformist.”). 
8 YALE KAMISAR ET AL., BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 505 (14th ed. 2015). 
9 After the publication of the Wickersham Commission Report in 1931, which documented 
pervasive use of the third degree in some police departments, see NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW 
OBSERVANCE & ENF’T, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (1931), one scholar 
noted the standard law enforcement reaction to allegations that the police used third degree 
tactics. RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 70 (2008) (noting 
that the Wickersham Report “was greeted by the police with two answers which they regarded 
as conclusive: first, there wasn’t any third degree; and second, they couldn’t do their work 
without it” (quoting DONALD L. SMITH, ZACHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY AND 
LAW 10 (1986))).  
10 KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 8, at 506-07 (“The Wickersham Report and other widely 
publicized accounts of the third degree led to a fundamental distrust of the police—an attitude 
that made it very difficult to obtain convictions. Although some of their colleagues hotly 
disputed the findings of the Wickersham Commission, police reformers realized that the third 
degree ‘had become a black mark on the image of policing’ and that they had to abolish it.” 
(quoting LEO, supra note 9, at 78)); see also DERSHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 47 (“The visual 
image of a violation of the privilege for most Americans remains the police beating or 
torturing a confession out of a person in their custody: the old ‘third degree.’”). 
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Tellingly, those who instruct police detectives on the proper methods of 
interrogation tell their pupils that coercion and coercive questioning is forbidden 
by the Constitution. Police interrogation manuals and other training materials 
are “the medium through which investigators acquire their working knowledge 
of the constitutional law of criminal procedure, the primary source of external 
restraint on their interrogation practices.”11 Indeed, the author of the first 
published police interrogation manual admonished his readers never to utilize 
third-degree tactics.12 And Fred Inbau, who wrote the first edition of what 
became “the most widely read and best known police interrogation manual in 
American history,”13 unequivocally opposed the use of coercion during police 
interrogation.14 Today’s interrogation manuals similarly proscribe using 
coercion or its equivalent during interrogation.15 
Of course, the Supreme Court, until very recently, had not disagreed with the 
view that the Constitution bars police from using coercion while interrogating a 
suspect. In a series of cases from the mid-1930s to the mid-1960s, the Court 
reversed state court convictions where police utilized coercion to obtain 
incriminating statements from suspects, and those statements were later 
admitted at trial.16 Concededly, the Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause as the constitutional basis for reversing state court 
convictions. The Due Process Clause provided the basis for judgment in these 
cases, in large part, because the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause 
was not applicable to the states during this time.17 Although the Fifth 
 
11 LEO, supra note 9, at 109. 
12 W.R. KIDD, POLICE INTERROGATION 46-47 (1940) (asserting that “[t]he third degree 
should never be used by the police,” and noting that “[p]erhaps the greatest harm done by the 
third degree methods lies in the eventual harm to the department”). 
13 KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 8, at 507. 
14 FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 185 (3d 
ed. 1953); see also FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND 
CONFESSIONS 27 (1962); Fred E. Inbau, Police Interrogation—A Practical Necessity, 52 J. 
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 16, 20 (1961). 
15 See, e.g., FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 212-16 
(4th ed. 2001).  
16 The first case where the Court reversed a state court conviction because police coerced 
a confession was Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Brown and some of the other 
early cases are discussed in KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 8, at 508-15, and GEORGE C. THOMAS 
III & RICHARD A. LEO, CONFESSIONS OF GUILT: FROM TORTURE TO MIRANDA AND BEYOND 
144-59 (2012). 
17 The Court made the privilege applicable to the States in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 
(1964). While the Court was announcing constitutional restraints on state police 
interrogations, it “had little occasion [to address] . . . the constitutional issues in dealing with 
federal interrogations.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463 (1966). This was because 
Congress had adopted Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required 
that suspects held by federal officers be promptly taken before a federal magistrate, see FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 5(a), and the Court’s implementation of that Rule in McNabb v. United States, 
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Amendment did not dictate the judgment in these cases, there was no reason to 
believe that the Justices were divided over the question of whether the Fifth 
Amendment barred coercion during police interrogation, or in any other legal 
proceeding, formal or informal. As Justice White’s dissenting opinion in 
Escobedo v. Illinois18 observed: the Fifth Amendment “addresses itself to the 
very issue of incriminating admissions [obtained by police during custodial 
interrogation] . . . and resolves it by proscribing only compelled statements.”19 
Once the amendment became applicable to state officials, even Justices opposed 
to the result in Miranda understood that the Fifth Amendment barred police 
coercion during the interrogation process.20 
This consensus that the Fifth Amendment bars government officials, whether 
it be the police, a judge, or legislative committee, from using coercion to demand 
incriminating answers was toppled after the Court’s ruling in Chavez v. 
Martinez.21 In that case, six Justices agreed that the Fifth Amendment does not 
protect against government use of coercion to induce incriminating responses; 
when government officials employ compulsion to obtain statements, a violation 
of the Constitution occurs only if those statements are used in a criminal case.22 
 
318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), made reliance on 
the Fifth Amendment unnecessary in federal cases. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 463.  
18 378 U.S. 478 (1964).  
19 Id. at 497 (White, J., dissenting). 
20 Cf. Justice Byron R. White, Recent Developments in Criminal Law, Address Before the 
Conference of Chief Justices in Council of State Governments at the 19th Annual Meeting of 
the Conference of Chief Justices (Aug. 3, 1967), in KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 8, at 669-70 
(explaining that while reasonable men may differ about the answer, the question presented in 
Miranda—whether a person under arrest is subject to compulsion when questioned by police 
in the station house—“is a perfectly straightforward one under the Fifth Amendment,” and 
the answer given by Miranda “is plainly a derivative of Malloy v. Hogan, [which] appl[ied] 
the Fifth Amendment to the States”). 
21 538 U.S. 760 (2003). 
22 In Chavez, Justice Thomas wrote for four Justices when he stated: “We fail to see how, 
based on the text of the Fifth Amendment, Martinez can allege a violation of this right, since 
Martinez was never prosecuted for a crime, let alone compelled to be a witness against himself 
in a criminal case. . . . The text of the Self-Incrimination Clause simply cannot support 
the . . . view that the mere use of compulsive questioning, without more, violates the 
Constitution.” Id. at 766-67 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). Justice Souter, joined by 
Justice Breyer, appeared to agree with the plurality’s view on this point, although Justice 
Souter’s view is not clear. See id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (“As [the 
plurality] points out, the text of the Fifth Amendment . . . focuses on courtroom use of a 
criminal defendant’s compelled, self-incriminating testimony, and the core of the guarantee 
against compelled self-incrimination is the exclusion of any such evidence.”). While Justice 
Souter’s opinion discussed the scope of the privilege and concluded that Martinez did not 
state a valid § 1983 claim for a Fifth Amendment violation, he offers a legal analysis different 
from that proffered by Justice Thomas. See infra notes 76-87 and accompanying text. 
Ultimately, however, one could conclude that a majority of the Justices in Chavez agreed that 
coercive police interrogation that produces incriminating statements does not violate the Fifth 
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Interestingly, before Chavez, the Court had not squarely confronted the issue of 
when a violation of the Fifth Amendment occurs.23 Over fifty years ago, the 
Court acknowledged that the right against self-incrimination “has two primary 
interrelated facets: The Government may not use compulsion to elicit self-
incriminating statements; and the Government may not permit the use in a 
criminal trial of self-incriminating statements elicited by compulsion.”24 Back 
then, the “conceptual difficulty of pinpointing” when a constitutional violation 
occurs—when the Government employs compulsion, or when the compelled 
statement is actually admitted at trial—was unimportant.25 Chavez forced the 
Court to decide when the violation occurs. Six Justices gave us their answer: a 
violation occurs when compelled incriminating statements are introduced in a 
criminal case. Coercion during police interrogation does not violate the Fifth 
Amendment.26 This answer not only resolved the Fifth Amendment claim raised 
in Chavez, but it also left no doubt that Americans do not enjoy a right to remain 
silent. Nor do persons, after Chavez, enjoy a substantive right to be free from 
coercive governmental questioning, or a constitutional protection against 
penalties or forms of punishment short of the initiation of a criminal case, such 
as a contempt order from a judge for failing to answer an incriminating question. 
When carefully examined, Chavez is a troubling ruling from several vantage 
points. The most disquieting aspect of Chavez, however, is Justice Thomas’s 
effort to remake Fifth Amendment law. As will be explained below, Justice 
Thomas’s opinion in Chavez is ultimately an effort to transform the Self-
Incrimination Clause from a substantive right to a judge-made prophylactic rule. 
Part I of this Article describes Chavez and the reasoning behind the Court’s Fifth 
Amendment ruling.27 Part II critiques the legal analysis of Justice Thomas’s and 
 
Amendment, unless those statements are admitted at a later prosecution. See John T. Parry, 
Constitutional Interpretation, Coercive Interrogation, and Civil Rights Litigation After 
Chavez v. Martinez, 39 GA. L. REV. 733, 763 (2005) (noting that under the plurality’s analysis, 
“[t]he privilege is irrelevant as a source of enforceable rights if the government never seeks 
to introduce the confession”). 
23 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 31 (“There is no direct precedential support for the 
conclusion that the privilege against self-incrimination is violated at the point when 
compulsion is employed, rather than at the point when its fruits are admitted at the criminal 
trial. But nor is there any direct support for the opposite view. It was an open question prior 
to [Chavez].”).  
24 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 57 n.6 (1964) (citation omitted). 
25 Id. 
26 See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 770 (plurality opinion); id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
27 The Justices also addressed whether Officer Chavez’s actions violated Martinez’s right 
to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. A majority of the Justices could 
not agree on the disposition of Martinez’s substantive due process claim. Ultimately, Justice 
Souter wrote for a majority of the Court, in Part II of his opinion, when he ruled that Martinez 
was entitled to a remand to determine the scope and merits of his substantive due process 
claim. Id. at 779-80 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).  
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Justice Souter’s opinions in Chavez. While Justices Thomas and Souter insist 
that their reasoning was commanded by the Court’s precedents, the facts in 
Chavez not only confronted the Court with a novel legal issue, but also, as the 
discussion below will show, the Court’s precedents pointed in a different 
direction than the result embraced by either Justice. Finally, Part III identifies 
some of the consequences for Fifth Amendment law under the logic of Chavez. 
PART I 
The facts in Chavez are tragic. Oliverio Martinez was shot and severely 
wounded during a confrontation with police.28 Two officers were questioning a 
person when Martinez approached on his bicycle.29 The officers ordered 
Martinez “to dismount, spread his legs, and place his hands behind his head.”30 
Martinez obeyed.31 Martinez was frisked and a knife was discovered in his 
waistband.32 A struggle then ensued, with the parties disagreeing about what 
happened next.33 What is undisputed is that one of the officers yelled, “‘He’s got 
my gun!’”34 The other officer then shot Martinez several times.35 The shooting 
left Martinez “permanently blinded and paralyzed from the waist down.”36 
A patrol supervisor, Officer Ben Chavez, who was not involved in the 
shooting, accompanied Martinez to the hospital and later questioned him over a 
forty-five-minute period while he was under arrest and receiving treatment for 
his wounds at a hospital.37 Officer Chavez gave no Miranda warnings before 
questioning, nor did he stop when Martinez protested that he was in extreme 
pain and requested that the interrogation end.38 Martinez eventually made 
incriminating statements to Officer Chavez, but no formal proceedings were 
ever brought against Martinez, as he was not charged with a crime.39 
Martinez filed a federal civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against Officer Chavez, claiming that the coercive questioning at the hospital 
violated the Fifth Amendment.40 Two lower federal courts ruled that Officer 
 
28 Id. at 764 (plurality opinion). 
29 Id. at 763.  
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 763-64. 
33 Id. at 764.  
34 Id.  
35 Id.  
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 764-65. Generally speaking, when a plaintiff files a § 1983 claim against a state 
official, the official may be entitled to qualified immunity, which would bar the lawsuit. See, 
e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009). Whether the official is entitled to 
qualified immunity turns on a two-pronged inquiry: a court must consider whether the facts 
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Chavez was not entitled to qualified immunity because he violated Martinez’s 
clearly established constitutional right not to be subjected to coercive 
interrogation.41 Specifically, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled 
that Officer Chavez’s coercive questioning violated Martinez’s Fifth 
Amendment rights “[e]ven though Martinez’s statements were not used against 
him in a criminal proceeding.”42 The Ninth Circuit also concluded that 
Martinez’s Fifth Amendment right was clearly established constitutional law 
because a reasonable police officer “would have known that persistent 
interrogation of the suspect despite repeated requests to stop violated the 
suspect’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from coercive 
interrogation.”43 
A.  Setting the Table 
The reasoning and result in Chavez were forecast by the federal government’s 
amicus brief supporting Officer Chavez. Put succinctly, the Solicitor General 
told the Justices that the Fifth Amendment does not control the actions of police 
officers. The constitutional privilege is a trial right; it does not govern what 
officers do in the field.44 According to the Solicitor General, the “sole concern” 
of the Fifth Amendment is to afford protection against being forced to give 
 
alleged show that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and if so, whether that 
right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 
194, 200-01 (2001). It should be noted that lower courts are no longer strictly circumscribed 
to the precise order of the Saucier two-step inquiry, and may exercise their discretion in 
resolving either of the two inquiries before the other. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. But see 
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 706-07 (2011) (recognizing such discretion, but cautioning 
that lower courts “should think hard, and then think hard again” before abandoning Saucier’s 
sequential two-step framework).  
41 See Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 270 F.3d 852, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2001); Martinez v. City 
of Oxnard, No. CV-98-9313-FMC(AJWX), 2000 WL 35502983, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 
2000).  
42 Martinez, 270 F.3d at 857. 
43 Id. at 858. 
44 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, Chavez v. 
Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (No. 01-1444) (“Numerous distinctive aspects of Fifth 
Amendment doctrine confirm that the Self-Incrimination Clause provides a ‘trial right’ for 
criminal defendants, rather than a limit on the primary conduct of law-enforcement officers 
in the field.” (citations omitted)). The petitioner’s brief made a similar argument. See Brief 
for Petitioner at 13, Chavez (No. 01-1444) (“Only if and when an individual is compelled to 
be a ‘witness’ against himself ‘in a[] criminal case’ is there a violation of the Compulsory 
Self-Incrimination Clause. And that final but crucial step occurs only if the compelled 
statement is used, either directly or derivatively, in an actual prosecution.”). Petitioner’s brief 
also argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “does not give an 
individual a freestanding—let alone an unqualified—‘substantive right to silence.’” Id. at 22-
23 (quoting Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1248 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also id. at 29-31.  
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testimony to the infliction of penalties affixed to criminal acts.45 To illustrate the 
limited role of the Fifth Amendment, the Solicitor General contrasted the 
differing functions of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Fourth 
Amendment, which guarantees a right to be free of unreasonable searches and 
seizures, controls the actions of police in the field.46 Because officers sometimes 
confront exigent circumstances while on patrol, certain Fourth Amendment rules 
are relaxed when police encounter an emergency.47 By contrast, according to the 
Solicitor General, “[i]n the Fifth Amendment context, the need for such an 
exemption is reduced, because the Amendment itself does not directly regulate 
primary police conduct.”48 Finally, during the oral argument in Chavez, at the 
start of his presentation, Deputy Solicitor General Paul Clement told the Justices 
that “the privilege against self-incrimination is not a direct limit on the primary 
conduct of . . . law enforcement officers.”49 A few moments later, Clement 
described the Court’s decision in United States v. Balsys50 as standing for the 
proposition that “the self-incrimination privilege is unusual because it’s not 
purely and simply binding on the Government. It doesn’t say that in all contexts, 
the Government cannot coerce confessions.”51 
B. The Opinion 
Justice Thomas’s opinion in Chavez followed the direction of the federal 
government’s brief.52 First, relying on the text of the Fifth Amendment, Justice 
Thomas explained that Martinez’s Fifth Amendment right was not violated 
because he “was never prosecuted for a crime, let alone compelled to be a 
witness against himself in a criminal case.”53 To support this conclusion, Justice 
Thomas found that police interrogation is not part of a “criminal case” under the 
Fifth Amendment. Justice Thomas asserted that a “criminal case” for Fifth 
Amendment purposes “at the very least requires the initiation of legal 
 
45 See Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 15 (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 
406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972)).  
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 17.  
50 524 U.S. 666 (1998).  
51 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 20. In Balsys, the Court ruled that a 
resident alien subpoenaed to testify about his wartime activities in Europe between 1940 and 
1945 and his immigration to the United States in 1961, could not invoke the Fifth Amendment 
to refuse to answer because he feared prosecution by the foreign governments of Lithuania 
and Israel. See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 669. There, the Court held that “concern with foreign 
prosecution is beyond the scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause.” Id.  
52 Three members of the Court—Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and Justice 
Scalia—joined Justice Thomas’s opinion analyzing and resolving Martinez’s Fifth 
Amendment claim. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 762 (2003).  
53 Id. at 766 (plurality opinion).  
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proceedings.”54 Obviously, no legal proceedings had commenced against 
Martinez.55 Although Thomas did not address “the precise moment when a 
‘criminal case’ commences” for Fifth Amendment purposes, he was certain that 
“police questioning does not constitute a ‘case’ any more than a private 
investigator’s precomplaint activities constitute a ‘civil case.’”56 While 
compelled statements induced by police cannot be used at a defendant’s criminal 
trial, “it is not until their use in a criminal case that a violation of the Self-
Incrimination Clause occurs.”57 Justice Thomas also explained that Martinez 
was “never made to be a ‘witness’ against himself in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause because his statements were never 
admitted as testimony against him in a criminal case.”58 Therefore, Justice 
Thomas maintained, the text of the amendment is not violated by “the mere use 
of compulsive questioning, without more.”59 
Second, Justice Thomas explained that the Court’s precedents did not support 
finding that Martinez’s Fifth Amendment right was violated. Justice Thomas 
observed: “It is well established that the government may compel witnesses to 
testify at trial or before a grand jury, on pain of contempt, so long as the witness 
is not the target of the criminal case in which he testifies.”60 According to Justice 
Thomas, the Court’s prior cases established that “mere coercion does not violate 
the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause absent use of the compelled statements 
in a criminal case against the witness.”61 He noted that persons can be compelled 
to provide incriminating statements “so long as those statements (or evidence 
derived from those statements) cannot be used against the speaker in any 
criminal case.”62 In fact, Justice Thomas compared Martinez’s situation to the 
“immunized witness forced to testify on pain of contempt.”63 To be sure, the 
immunized witness knows that his compelled testimony cannot be used against 
him at a later trial; Martinez, however, lacked such knowledge.64 That 
difference, in Justice Thomas’s judgment, did not mean Martinez suffered a 
constitutional harm—both the immunized witness and Martinez were subjected 
 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 764. 
56 Id. at 767. 
57 Id. at 767 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)). 
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 767-68 (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984); Kastigar v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972)).  
61 Id. at 769. 
62 Id. at 768 (citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 602-04 (1896); Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 
458; United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671-72 (1998)). Justice Thomas also cited the 
“penalty cases,” notably Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973), and Lefkowitz v. 
Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977). See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 768. 
63 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 769. 
64 Id.  
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to governmental compulsion. Thus, as Justice Thomas put it, the immunized 
witness’s ex ante knowledge that his compelled testimony cannot be used 
against him, “does not make the statements of the immunized witness any less 
‘compelled.’”65 
Justice Thomas acknowledged that where immunity has not been granted, the 
compelled statements of witnesses testifying before a grand jury or legislative 
committee cannot be used at a later trial.66 He also recognized that officials 
cannot punish public employees or government contractors “to induce them to 
waive their immunity from the use of their compelled statements in subsequent 
criminal proceedings.”67 However, under Justice Thomas’s view of the Fifth 
Amendment, “immunity is not itself a right secured by the text of the [Fifth 
Amendment], but rather a prophylactic rule” the Court has announced to enforce 
it.68 
To support his understanding of how the Fifth Amendment protects against 
compelled self-incrimination in criminal cases, Justice Thomas drew an 
important distinction between assertion of one’s Fifth Amendment rights and 
violation of the right itself. According to Justice Thomas, a person can assert the 
Fifth Amendment in any proceeding.69 However, “a violation of the 
constitutional right against self-incrimination occurs only if one has been 
compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case.”70 Therefore, 
Justice Thomas explained, the Court has created “an evidentiary privilege that 
protects witnesses from being forced to give incriminating testimony, even in 
noncriminal cases, unless that testimony has been immunized from use and 
derivative use in a future criminal proceeding before it is compelled.”71 But 
judicially created rules designed to protect a “constitutional right,” do not, under 
Justice Thomas’s view, “extend the scope of the constitutional right itself.”72 
Offering two examples of how the Fifth Amendment operates, Justice 
Thomas observed that in the “penalty cases,” the Fifth Amendment may be 
“asserted” by a witness in a noncriminal proceeding or setting “in order to 
safeguard the core constitutional right defined by the Self-Incrimination 
Clause—the right not to be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against oneself.”73 Similarly, the Miranda warnings and the rule mandating that 
statements obtained in violation of Miranda be excluded from criminal 
 
65 Id. 
66 See id. at 771.  
67 Id. at 768 n.2 (citing Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n v. Comm’r of Sanitation, 392 
U.S. 280 (1968); Turley, 414 U.S. 70). 
68 Id.  
69 See id. at 770. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 770-71 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972); Maness v. 
Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1975)). 
72 Id. at 772. 
73 Id. 
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proceedings, are prophylactic measures designed to safeguard the “right 
protected by the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause—the admission into 
evidence in a criminal case of confessions obtained through coercive custodial 
questioning.”74 Applying this logic, Justice Thomas concluded that because 
Martinez was not compelled to be a “witness” against himself in any “criminal 
case,” his Fifth Amendment claim has no merit.75 
Justice Souter wrote an opinion in which he agreed with Justice Thomas’s 
analysis of the Fifth Amendment, although he believed that the Court’s ruling 
“requires a degree of discretionary judgment greater than Justice Thomas 
acknowledges.”76 Justice Souter subscribed to Justice Thomas’s reading of the 
text of the amendment, which “focuses on courtroom use of a criminal 
defendant’s compelled, self-incriminating testimony.”77 According to Justice 
Souter, the “core of the guarantee” of the Fifth Amendment is the exclusion of 
any coerced statement from the “courtroom.”78 But because Martinez sought a 
monetary remedy for Officer Chavez’s coercive conduct, Souter maintained, his 
claim is “well outside the core of Fifth Amendment protection.”79 
That Martinez’s claim falls out of the “core” of Fifth Amendment protection, 
however, did not necessarily justify rejecting his claim, according to Justice 
Souter. Relying on a view Justice Harlan outlined in his dissent in Miranda, 
Justice Souter explained that expansions of the textual guarantee are warranted 
“if clearly shown to be desirable means to protect the basic right against the 
invasive pressures of contemporary society.”80 Such extensions of the core right, 
according to Justice Souter, explained several of the Court’s Fifth Amendment 
precedents, including rulings forbidding compulsion of witnesses in civil 
proceedings, requiring grants of immunity in advance of compelled testimony 
before grand juries, and preventing governmental threats or penalties that 
undermine the right to immunity.81 This prophylactic understanding of the Fifth 
 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 772-73 (explaining that “the absence of a ‘criminal case’ in which Martinez was 
compelled to be a ‘witness’ against himself defeats his core Fifth Amendment claim”). Justice 
Thomas also opined on a question not presented to the Court: Officer Chavez’s failure to read 
Miranda warnings to Martinez did not violate Martinez’s constitutional rights and cannot be 
grounds for a § 1983 action. Id. at 772. That conclusion is based on the view that Miranda 
warnings are not constitutional rights themselves, but merely prophylactic measures designed 
to protect the Fifth Amendment. Id. (“We have likewise established the Miranda exclusionary 
rule as a prophylactic measure to prevent violations of the right protected by the text of the 
Self-Incrimination Clause . . . .”).  
76 Id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Breyer joined Justice Souter’s 
opinion in its entirety. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. 
80 Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 515 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
81 See id. at 777-78 (collecting cases).  
  
2017] THE PROPHYLACTIC FIFTH AMENDMENT 1059 
 
Amendment, according to Justice Souter, also explained Miranda.82 Put 
differently, many of the Court’s Fifth Amendment rulings are “outside the Fifth 
Amendment’s core, with each case expressing a judgment that the core 
guarantee, or the judicial capacity to protect it,” would be undercut without such 
“complementary protection.”83 
According to Justice Souter, Martinez did not demonstrate the “powerful 
showing” needed to justify expanding protection of the core Fifth Amendment 
to include civil liability.84 The “most obvious drawback” to Martinez’s claim 
was “its risk of global application” every time a police officer violates the rules 
announced in Miranda and its progeny, or every time a government official 
violates one of the rules announced by the Court’s other Fifth Amendment 
precedents.85 Without explaining why, Justice Souter stated that recognizing 
civil liability in such scenarios “would revolutionize” Fifth Amendment 
doctrine, and begged the question why such an extension was necessary.86 
Finally, Justice Souter had “no reason to believe” that current law had been 
defective in protecting the core Fifth Amendment right.87 
PART II 
A. Should the Text of the Fifth Amendment Be Read Literally? 
The text of the Self-Incrimination Clause was the ultimate basis for rejecting 
Martinez’s claim that his Fifth Amendment right was violated when Officer 
Chavez coerced him to make incriminating statements.88 Indeed, Justice Thomas 
 
82 See id. at 778. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 515, 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).  
85 Id. Justice Souter’s concern was summarized as follows: 
If obtaining Martinez’s statement is to be treated as a stand-alone violation of the 
privilege subject to compensation, why should the same not be true whenever the police 
obtain any involuntary self-incriminating statement, or whenever the government so 
much threatens a penalty in derogation of the right to immunity, or whenever the police 
fail to honor Miranda? Martinez offers no limiting principle or reason to foresee a 
stopping place short of liability in all such cases. 
Id. at 778-79 (footnote omitted). Justice Souter feared that awarding Martinez compensation 
would mean that federal courts would have to also award compensation in all of the instances 
he described. Justice Souter’s concern “seems to suggest a fear of too much justice.” 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
86 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 779 (“Martinez has offered no reason to believe that the guarantee 
has been ineffective in all or many of those circumstances in which its vindication has 
depended on excluding testimonial admissions or barring penalties.”). 
87 Id. 
88 The first sentence of Justice Thomas’s opinion appears to cast doubt about whether 
Chavez compelled Martinez to incriminate himself: “This case involves a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
suit arising out of petitioner Ben Chavez’s allegedly coercive interrogation of respondent 
Oliverio Martinez.” Id. at 763 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). Despite Justice Thomas’s 
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chided Justice Kennedy, who believed that Martinez’s Fifth Amendment right 
was violated,89 for “indifference to the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause, as 
well as a conspicuous absence of a single citation to the actual text of the Fifth 
Amendment.”90 But the notion that the text of the Fifth Amendment properly 
and definitively resolves the issue raised in Chavez is facetious and ignores a 
century of the Court’s Fifth Amendment rulings, which have rejected a literal 
reading of the amendment when deciding the scope and meaning of the Self-
Incrimination Clause. Equally troubling, a literal and wooden reading of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege as a basis for the Court’s judgment makes no sense 
because the text of the amendment is subject to differing interpretations—both 
broad and narrow. 
Acknowledging the ambiguous nature of the privilege is unremarkable. As 
legal historian John Langbein has observed, the “history of the privilege against 
self-incrimination at common law has long been murky.”91 Further, the Framing 
generation was aware of the problem, as have been several generations of 
lawyers and judges.92 Because Justice Thomas often professes to be concerned 
 
suggestion that Martinez may not have been coerced, counsel for Chavez conceded during the 
oral argument that Chavez used coercion to obtain incriminating statements. See Transcript 
of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 14 (“I acknowledge that there is coercion in this case. We 
don’t—we don’t blanch on that. There was coercion and the facts of this case are tragic, but 
the—but the reality is this. This officer was there to find out a very important piece of 
information under extraordinarily exigent circumstances.”). 
89 See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 789-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“A constitutional right is traduced the moment torture or its close equivalents are brought to 
bear. Constitutional protection for a tortured suspect is not held in abeyance until some later 
criminal proceeding takes place.”); id. at 791 (explaining that the Fifth Amendment “protects 
an individual from being forced to give answers demanded by an official in any context when 
the answers might give rise to criminal liability in the future”).  
90 Id. at 773 n.4 (plurality opinion). 
91 John H. Langbein, The Privilege and Common Law Criminal Procedure: The Sixteenth 
to the Eighteenth Centuries, in R. H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 82, 100 (1997).  
92 See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 4, at 422-27. As Levy explains, James Madison’s original 
proposal for the Fifth Amendment right used phrasing that was “original,” and his placement 
of the privilege in the Bill of Rights was “unusual.” Id. at 423. Madison’s language “revealed 
an intent to incorporate into the Constitution the whole scope of the common-law right.” Id. 
According to Levy: 
Madison’s [original] proposal certainly applied to civil as well as criminal proceedings 
and in principle to any stage of a legal inquiry, from the moment of arrest in a criminal 
case, to the swearing of a deposition in a civil one. And not being restricted to judicial 
proceedings, it extended to any other kind of governmental inquiry such as a legislative 
investigation. . . . Madison, going beyond the recommendations of the states and the 
constitution of his own state, phrased his own proposal to make it coextensive with the 
broadest practice. 
Id. at 423-24. 
After Madison’s proposal was amended so that the right “be confined to criminal cases,” 
id. at 424, if one interpreted the privilege literally, it “excluded from its protection parties and 
  
2017] THE PROPHYLACTIC FIFTH AMENDMENT 1061 
 
with the intention and thinking of the Framing era when deciding constitutional 
cases,93 it is a bit ironic that his opinion in Chavez paid no attention to the 
uncertain background surrounding the privilege and failed to cite any history of 
the amendment to support his conclusion that no violation of the Fifth 
Amendment occurs when police use coercion to obtain incriminating statements. 
It is worth noting that Justice Thomas’s opinion departs from a line of common 
law precedent predating the Bill of Rights. English and American courts in the 
seventeenth century “protected” common law defendants from giving self-
incriminating testimony by preventing them from giving any kind of testimony 
sworn under oath.94 In contrast, witnesses for the prosecution and witnesses in 
civil cases were given the opportunity to decline to answer incriminating 
questions,95 and they invoked the privilege at high rates.96 In other words, 
English courts in the era antedating the Bill of Rights recognized the privilege 
of a witness not to answer incriminating questions. “But the evidentiary privilege 
extended only to sworn witnesses. It didn’t extend to criminal defendants, who 
weren’t sworn and who were expected (though never ‘compelled’) to talk.”97 
This historical understanding of the privilege against self-incrimination 
underscores the long-standing practice of extending the privilege in noncriminal 
 
witnesses in civil and equity suits as well as witnesses before nonjudicial governmental 
proceedings such as legislative investigations,” id. at 425. 
93 See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 56 (2000) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (stating that he is not convinced that the Court’s prior precedents on the 
constitutionality of roadblocks under the Fourth Amendment were correctly decided and 
doubting that “the Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have considered ‘reasonable’ a 
program of indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of wrongdoing”); United States 
v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that considerable 
evidence suggests that the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment “protects against the 
compelled production not just of incriminating testimony, but of any incriminating evidence,” 
and expressing a willingness to “reconsider the scope and meaning of the Self-Incrimination 
Clause”); cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(noting that the Court’s Commerce Clause precedents have “drifted far from the original 
understanding of the Commerce Clause” and suggesting that the Court “ought to temper [its] 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a manner that both makes sense of [its] more recent case 
law and is more faithful to the original understanding of that Clause”).  
94 See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to 
Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2659 (1996).  
95 Id. (“Unlike defendants, prosecution witnesses and witnesses in civil cases were sworn, 
and when they invoked the privilege, the courts forbade other trial participants from asking 
them incriminating questions.”).  
96 Id. at 2659 n.131 (“In the trial of Sir John Friend, 13 How. St. Tr. 1, 17 (1669), Lord 
Chief Justice Treby said of a witness, ‘no man is bound to answer any questions that will 
subject him to a penalty or to infamy.’”).  
97 Email from Albert W. Alschuler, Professor of Law, Northwestern Univ. Pritzker Sch. 
of Law, to Tracey Maclin, Professor of Law, Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law (Feb. 5, 2017, 04:41 
EST) (on file with author).  
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settings that could lead to later criminal punishment.98 As a matter of history, 
Justice Thomas’s opinion ignores that “the privilege not to give answers in non-
criminal settings that could lead to criminal prosecution was the original 
privilege against self-incrimination.”99 
Although this is not the forum for a detailed review of the Fifth Amendment’s 
origins and history,100 to fully understand the right not to be compelled to be a 
witness against oneself, it is important to recall a few details about its history 
and development. The First Congress, which proposed the Bill of Rights for 
ratification to the states, positioned the Self-Incrimination Clause in the Fifth 
Amendment, and not the Sixth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment contains an 
amalgam of rights, including the right to have a grand jury’s presentment or 
indictment before being charged with a “capital, or otherwise infamous crime,” 
the right against double jeopardy, the right to due process before being deprived 
of life, liberty or property, and the right not to have private property taken for 
public use, without just compensation.101 The Sixth Amendment collected the 
procedural rights of the criminally accused after indictment.102 By not placing 
the privilege in the Sixth Amendment, Congress afforded a right that extended 
to persons who had not been charged with a criminal offense. Put another way, 
“the location of the self-incrimination clause in the Fifth Amendment rather than 
the Sixth [Amendment] proves that the Senate, like the House, did not intend to 
restrict that clause to the criminal defendant only nor only to his trial.”103 The 
right embodied in the privilege, even considering that the text says “criminal 
case,” stated a “principle broadly enough to apply to witnesses and to any phase 
of the proceedings.”104 
When Justice Thomas concluded that Martinez’s Fifth Amendment right was 
not violated because his compelled statements were not used in a criminal 
 
98 See Alschuler, supra note 94, at 2659.  
99 Email from Albert W. Alschuler to Tracey Maclin, supra note 97.  
100 Several scholars have provided comprehensive studies of the Fifth Amendment’s 
history. See generally R. H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 91; LEVY, supra note 4; LEWIS 
MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? 9-19 (1959); 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 821-26b (Chadbourn rev. 1970); Alschuler, supra 
note 94; E. M. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949); 
R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935).  
101 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
102 See id. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a speedy and public 
trial by an impartial jury of one’s peers, to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation, to be confronted by all witnesses, to have a compulsory process for obtaining 
one’s own witnesses, and to have the assistance of counsel for one’s defense. Id.  
103 LEVY, supra note 4, at 427. 
104 Id. Without disputing this history, another scholar of the Fifth Amendment’s origins 
notes that “the legislative history of the Fifth Amendment adds little to our understanding of 
the history of the privilege.” Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the 
Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1123 (1994). 
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prosecution, he was not enforcing the provision as written. Instead, Justice 
Thomas put his own gloss on the text.105 In commenting on the literal words of 
the privilege, Justice Brennan once observed: 
 The words of the Fifth Amendment do not, in terms, suggest that 
government may compel men to incriminate themselves provided it 
promises that it will not prosecute them for the crimes revealed. The clause 
does not prohibit a prosecution or conviction; it prohibits the application 
vel non of compulsion to an individual to force testimony that incriminates 
him, regardless of whether he is actually prosecuted.106 
Put differently, despite his professed fealty to the text of the Fifth 
Amendment, Justice Thomas did exactly what Justice Douglass criticized the 
majority for in Ullmann v. United States,107 nearly fifty years earlier: 
The guarantee is that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself.” The majority does not enforce that guarantee 
as written but qualifies it; and the qualification apparently reads, “but only 
if criminal conviction might result.” Wisely or not, the Fifth Amendment 
protects against the compulsory self-accusation of crime without exception 
or qualification.108 
Moreover, although none of the Justices who rejected Martinez’s Fifth 
Amendment claim are willing to admit it, the text of the privilege is not as clear 
they contend. The right guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment extends beyond 
“self-incrimination,” a term not found in the text. As Levy explains: 
The “right against self-incrimination” is a short-hand gloss of modern 
origin that implies a restriction not in the constitutional clause. The right 
not to be a witness against oneself imports a principle of wider reach, 
applicable, at least in criminal cases, to the self-production of any adverse 
evidence, including evidence that made one the herald of his own infamy, 
thereby publicly disgracing him. The clause extended, in other words, to 
all the injurious as well as incriminating consequences of disclosure by 
witness or party.109 
Put simply, to interpret the privilege as confined to a right against self-
incrimination “stunts the wider right . . . not to be a witness against oneself.”110 
Ultimately, Justice Thomas neglects a crucial point: the literal terms of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege do not convey a single meaning. The Justices recognized 
 
105 In fairness to Justice Thomas, he is not the first jurist to do this. 
106 Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 564 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
107 350 U.S. 422 (1956). 
108 Id. at 443 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
109 LEVY, supra note 4, at 427. 
110 Id. 
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this fact long ago. In 1896, the Court stated that the right embodied in the Fifth 
Amendment “is obviously susceptible of two interpretations.”111 
On the one hand, if she were so inclined, a judge could literally read the text 
of the Fifth Amendment to protect a person against any harmful disclosure, 
including civil liability, regardless of whether that person was charged with a 
crime. Such a broad reading of the clause is not forbidden by the text, and many 
judges, from the Framing era to more modern times, have expressly adopted this 
broad reading of the privilege.112 In Brown v. Walker, a majority of the Court 
acknowledged that the amendment could be construed literally “as authorizing 
the witness to refuse to disclose any fact which might tend to incriminate, 
disgrace or expose him to unfavorable comments.”113 The dissenters went even 
further. Three of the dissenting Justices in Brown read the privilege to guarantee 
an absolute right to silence, which Congress could not divest even with a grant 
of immunity,114 while the fourth dissenter read the amendment to protect a 
person “from all compulsory testimony which would expose him to infamy and 
disgrace, though the facts disclosed might not lead to a criminal prosecution.”115 
 
111 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 595 (1896). 
112 See, e.g., Ullman, 350 U.S. at 450-53 (“The Fifth Amendment was designed to protect 
the accused against infamy as well as against prosecution.”); id. at 454 (“When public opinion 
casts a person into the outer darkness, as happens today when a person is exposed as a 
Communist, the government brings infamy on the head of the witness when it compels 
disclosure. That is precisely what the Fifth Amendment prohibits.”); Brown, 161 U.S. at 630 
(Field, J., dissenting) (“The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States gives 
absolute protection to a person called as a witness in a criminal case against the compulsory 
enforcement of any criminating testimony against himself. . . . No substitute for the protection 
contemplated by the amendment would be sufficient were its operation less extensive and 
efficient.”); id. at 631 (“All [phrases or words of any provision of the amendment] are to be 
construed liberally that they may have the widest and most ample effect.”); United States v. 
James, 60 F. 257, 265 (N.D. Ill. 1894) (“[T]he privilege of silence, against a criminal 
accusation, guarantied[sic] by the fifth amendment, was meant to extend to all the 
consequences of disclosure.”). Additionally, as Levy notes: 
After the adoption of the Fifth Amendment, the earliest state and federal cases were in 
accord with [the view that the right not to be a witness against oneself included protection 
against any injurious disclosures], which suggests that whatever the wording of the 
constitutional formulation, it did not supersede or even limit the common-law 
right. . . . The state courts of the framers’ generation followed the extension of the right 
to cover self-infamy as well as self-incrimination, although the self-infamy rule 
eventually fell into disuse. 
LEVY, supra note 4, at 427-29 (footnote omitted).  
113 Brown, 161 U.S. at 595. 
114 See id. at 610 (Shiras, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Fifth Amendment means “not 
merely that every person should have such immunity [from compelled testimony], but that his 
right thereto should not be divested or impaired by any act of Congress”). 
115 Id. at 631 (Field, J., dissenting). In the end, the Brown majority chose to interpret the 
amendment “to effect a practical and beneficent purpose.” Id. at 596 (majority opinion). 
According to the majority, the Fifth Amendment does not “protect witnesses against every 
possible detriment which might happen to them from their testimony, nor to unduly impede, 
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On the other hand, if a judge were so inclined, she could read the text to mean 
that a violation of the Fifth Amendment only occurs when the Government 
compels a person to testify against himself in a criminal trial.116 As then-Justice 
Rehnquist noted, “the constitutional language in which the privilege is cast 
might be construed to apply only to situations in which the prosecution seeks to 
call a defendant to testify against himself at his criminal trial.”117 Moreover, a 
judge could go further by literally reading the text to permit the prosecution to 
introduce “evidence obtained prior to trial by police or judicial coercion” 
because “[t]he words of the Fifth Amendment say nothing about evidence.”118 
Indeed, a strict (and plausible) reading of the text of the Fifth Amendment: 
[P]rohibits the government only from compelling a person to testify—that’s 
what “a witness” does—“against himself” in “any criminal case.” Its words 
do not prohibit the police from testifying about—or playing a recording 
of—what the defendant said when he was merely a suspect and not yet a 
witness, after the police compelled him to speak but before the criminal 
trial began. Nor does it prohibit a clerk from reading the transcript of 
testimony the person was compelled by a judge to give in a noncriminal 
case. So long as the defendant himself is not called as an actual witness by 
the prosecution and compelled to give live testimony against himself at the 
criminal trial itself, the text of the Constitution—literally read, as Justice 
Thomas said it should be—is not violated.119 
Although this literal interpretation of the text might be shocking to persons 
raised during an era when police on television shows and in the movies inform 
suspects of their “right to silence,” it is a plausible view of the Fifth 
Amendment’s bare terms. 
In light of these alternative readings of the privilege, it is not obvious why 
Justice Thomas’s interpretation of the text is the only permissible reading of the 
privilege. Certainly, Justice Thomas, who fails to cite any history of the Fifth 
Amendment, makes no effort to explain why his literal reading is the only, let 
alone best, interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. What Justice Thomas ignores 
in Chavez is that the Court disavowed a literal interpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment at the end of the nineteenth century. Just as the Government did in 
Chavez in 2003, the federal government in 1892 urged the Court in Counselman 
v. Hitchcock120 to construe the Fifth Amendment literally. The Court demurred: 
 
hinder or obstruct the administration of criminal justice.” Id.  
116 In 1936, dicta from the Court’s decision in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), 
observed that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is restricted to “the 
processes of justice by which the accused may be called as a witness and required to testify,” 
id. at 285. 
117 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974). 
118 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 29. As Alan Dershowitz rightly notes, such a result was 
“categorically rejected by the entire court in [Chavez].” Id. 
119 Id. at 29-30. 
120 142 U.S. 547 (1892).  
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“It is impossible that the meaning of the constitutional provision can only be, 
that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal 
prosecution against himself.”121 Certainly, the amendment covers cases where 
the Government compels a defendant to testify at his own prosecution; “but it is 
not limited to them.”122 The object of the privilege was to guarantee that a 
“person should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, 
to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed a 
crime.”123 The Counselman Court explained that the text of the Fifth 
Amendment limits the privilege “to criminal matters, but it is as broad as the 
mischief against which it seeks to guard.”124 Since 1892, in case after case, the 
Court has turned away efforts to read the privilege in a literal manner.125 The 
problems associated with a literal reading of the Fifth Amendment, coupled with 
the Court’s consistent disapproval of such an approach, prompted Erwin 
Griswold, “the conservative Dean of . . . Harvard Law School,”126 in 1962 to 
provide this answer to the question of whether the Fifth Amendment should be 
read literally: “This is a question which was raised and answered long ago, so 
long ago in fact that lawyers tend to take it for granted. But early courts saw that 
the protection of the amendment itself would be an empty gesture if it was 
literally applied.”127 Incredibly, Justice Thomas’s opinion in Chavez ignores all 
of this. 
In light of the above discussion, it is understandable why Justice Kennedy 
eschewed a literal interpretation of the Constitution in deciding whether Officer 
Chavez violated the Fifth Amendment when he employed coercion to obtain an 
incriminating statement from Martinez. According to Justice Kennedy, the 
Court’s precedents and the nation’s “legal tradition establish that the Self-
Incrimination Clause is a substantive constraint on the conduct of the 
Government, not merely an evidentiary rule governing the work of the 
 
121 Id. at 562. In Counselman, the Government argued that a grand jury proceeding is not 
a “criminal case” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Id. The Court rejected that 
view. See id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 See, e.g., Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956) (“[T]he history of the 
privilege establishes . . . that it is not to be interpreted literally.”); Quinn v. United States, 349 
U.S. 155, 161-65 (1955) (discussing the application of the Fifth Amendment to the case before 
the Court, but not pausing to consider whether a hearing conducted by a subcommittee of the 
House of Representatives was in fact a “criminal case” within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment); Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 194 (1955) (explaining in a case where 
a witness was subpoenaed to testify before a congressional committee, that “no ritualistic 
formula or talismanic phrase is essential in order to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination”); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (rejecting the government’s 
argument that the Fifth Amendment “does not apply in any civil proceeding”).  
126 LEVY, supra note 4, at viii. 
127 GRISWOLD, supra note 5, at 54-55. 
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courts.”128 It requires a considerable degree of judicial arrogance to insist that 
the Fifth Amendment must be read literally.129 The Court’s Self-Incrimination 
Clause jurisprudence, which is more than a century old, says the exact opposite. 
But Justice Thomas must believe he knows better. 
B. The Court’s Precedents 
Justice Thomas in Chavez also insisted that his literal interpretation of the 
privilege and resultant conclusion that Martinez did not suffer a Fifth 
Amendment violation were mandated by the Court’s precedents. According to 
Justice Thomas, prior rulings established that “mere coercion does not violate 
the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause absent use of the compelled statements 
in a criminal case against the witness.”130 Like his analysis of the Fifth 
Amendment’s text, Justice Thomas’s discussion of the Court’s precedents is 
one-sided and omits consideration of cases where the Court found Fifth 
Amendment violations because government officials employed coercion to 
obtain incriminating admissions. 
To be sure, in one of the so-called “penalty cases,”131 Garrity v. New Jersey,132 
the Court held that the Fifth Amendment bars “use in subsequent criminal 
proceedings of statements obtained under threat of removal from office.”133 But 
 
128 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 791 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
129 Justice Kennedy’s reaction to Justice Thomas’s and Justice Souter’s reading of the Fifth 
Amendment is worth quoting in-full: 
The conclusion that the Self-Incrimination Clause is not violated until the government 
seeks to use a statement in some later criminal proceeding strips the Clause of an 
essential part of its force and meaning. This is no small matter. It should come as an 
unwelcome surprise to judges, attorneys, and the citizenry as a whole that if a legislative 
committee or a judge in a civil case demands incriminating testimony without offering 
immunity, and even imposes sanctions for failure to comply, that the witness and counsel 
cannot insist the right against compelled self-incrimination is applicable then and there. 
Justice Souter and Justice Thomas, I submit, should be more respectful of the 
understanding that has prevailed for generations now. To tell our whole legal system that 
when conducting a criminal investigation police officials can use severe compulsion or 
even torture with no present violation of the right against compelled self-incrimination 
can only diminish a celebrated provision in the Bill of Rights. A Constitution survives 
over time because the people share a common, historic commitment to certain simple 
but fundamental principles which preserve their freedom. Today’s decision undermines 
one of those respected precepts. 
Id. at 793-94. 
130 Id. at 769 (plurality opinion). 
131 The “penalty cases” refer to a series of cases where “the state not only compelled an 
individual to appear and testify, but also sought to induce him to forego the Fifth Amendment 
privilege by threatening to impose economic or other sanctions ‘capable of forcing the self-
incrimination which the Amendment forbids.’” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 
(1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977)).  
132 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
133 Id. at 500 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the Garrity Court did not—as Justice 
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Garrity was just one of several cases interpreting the Fifth Amendment’s 
application to government efforts to induce incriminating statements. Other 
rulings, announced before and after Garrity, involve cases where the Court 
found Fifth Amendment violations when government officials utilize 
compulsion to induce a statement, “even where there was no possibility that a 
statement would be used in a criminal trial, and even where no statement was 
generated.”134 
As already discussed, Counselman rejected the government’s efforts to 
impose a narrow interpretation to the amendment’s phrase “in any criminal case” 
and held that the privilege is applicable in a grand jury proceeding.135 A literal 
reading of the amendment’s text in Counselman “would have drained the 
privilege of most of its vitality.”136 After Counselman, it was still available for 
the Government to contend that the amendment’s text—“in any criminal case”—
meant that the privilege was unavailable when the compelled testimony was 
sought in a civil case. McCarthy v. Arndstein137 eliminated that argument. 
After being adjudged an involuntary bankrupt, Arndstein was subpoenaed to 
testify before a special commissioner to examine and distribute his assets 
pursuant to federal bankruptcy law.138 At a civil bankruptcy hearing, Arndstein 
invoked the privilege to certain questions.139 Arndstein made no incriminating 
statements and was not prosecuted for a criminal offense; he was, however, 
judged in contempt.140 Arndstein subsequently filed a writ of habeas corpus 
seeking his release.141 The federal government argued before the Court, in light 
of the Fifth Amendment’s text, that the privilege does not apply in a civil 
proceeding; the Court, however, disagreed.142 
 
Thomas did in Chavez—adopt a literal interpretation of the privilege. See id. at 496-500 
(discussing the Court’s prior decisions of applying the privilege outside of a strict 
interpretation of “criminal case”). For a comprehensive review of Garrity and its impact on 
the prosecution of police officers, see generally Steven D. Clymer, Compelled Statements 
from Police Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309 (2001). 
134 Susan R. Klein, No Time for Silence, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1337, 1341 (2003); see also id. 
at 1341-43 (collecting cases).  
135 See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892); supra notes 120-24 and 
accompanying text.  
136 Charles E. Moylan, Jr. & John Sonsteng, The Privilege Against Compelled Self-
Incrimination, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 249, 280 (1990). As Charles Moylan and John 
Sonsteng explain, Counselman “reasoned that the privilege was available in any forum, civil 
or criminal, legislative or judicial, investigative or adjudicative, so long as the testimony there 
compelled might later be used against the witness ‘in any criminal case.’” Id.  
137 266 U.S. 34 (1924). 
138 Id. at 38.  
139 Id.  
140 Id. 
141 Id.  
142 Id. at 40 (“The government insists, broadly, that the constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination does not apply in any civil proceeding. The contrary must be accepted as 
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The Court explained that the privilege “is not ordinarily dependent upon the 
nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It 
applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend 
to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it.”143 If the protections of 
the privilege are operative in a grand jury proceeding and a civil bankruptcy 
hearing, neither of which is a “criminal case,” logic suggests that the 
amendment’s protections are operative during police interrogation, especially 
when the target of the interrogation “reasonably believes [that his disclosures] 
could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might 
be so used.”144 This is exactly the situation Martinez faced. 
In Spevack v. Klein,145 a companion case to Garrity, a lawyer faced a 
disciplinary proceeding for professional misconduct.146 The lawyer refused to 
testify and would not produce any of his records, invoking the Fifth 
Amendment.147 Although the lawyer did not incriminate himself and faced no 
subsequent criminal prosecution, he was ordered disbarred by the New York 
courts.148 The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the State employed 
impermissible compulsion and thus violated the lawyer’s Fifth Amendment 
right.149 In light of Garrity’s ruling excluding compelled statements and their 
fruits from a subsequent criminal prosecution,150 Spevack’s holding seems 
“justifiable only on the ground that it is an essential measure to protect against 
self-incrimination—to prevent what may well be a successful attempt to elicit 
incriminating admissions.”151 Tellingly, none of the dissenters in Spevack relied 
on the Fifth Amendment’s text in rejecting Spevack’s claim. Even Justice 
Harlan, “the great dissenter” on the Warren Court,152 acknowledged that the 
 
settled.”).  
143 Id.  
144 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972). 
145 385 U.S. 511 (1967). 
146 Id. at 512. 
147 Id. at 512-13.  
148 Id. at 513. Relying on Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961), which held that the 
privilege was not applicable in state disbarment proceedings, see id. at 125-29, the New York 
courts ruled that the privilege was unavailable to Spevack in legal disciplinary proceedings, 
see In re Spevack, 213 N.E.2d 457, 457-58 (N.Y.), aff’g 24 A.D.2d 653 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1965).  
149 Spevack, 385 U.S. at 516 (“The threat of disbarment and the loss of professional 
standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion to make 
a lawyer relinquish the privilege. That threat is indeed as powerful an instrument of 
compulsion as ‘the use of legal process to force from the lips of the accused individual the 
evidence necessary to convict him . . . .’” (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 
(1944)). 
150 See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967); supra notes 132-34 and 
accompanying text.  
151 Spevack, 385 U.S. at 531 (White, J., dissenting). 
152 See generally TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER 
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“Constitution contains no formulae with which we can calculate the areas 
within . . . which the privilege should extend, and the Court has therefore been 
obliged to fashion for itself standards for the application of the privilege.”153 
Likewise, in Gardner v. Broderick154 and Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n v. 
Commissioner of Sanitation,155 a New York City police officer and New York 
City sanitation employees, respectively, filed civil actions claiming that they had 
been unlawfully dismissed from their jobs because they refused to waive their 
Fifth Amendment privilege when subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury 
investigating criminal activity.156 Again, in both cases, no incriminating 
statements were obtained from the city workers and no criminal charges were 
filed.157 None of the city workers were offered immunity for their testimony.158 
Nonetheless, the Court, speaking through Justice Fortas in both cases, concluded 
that the workers could not be dismissed from their jobs for invoking and thereby 
refusing to waive their Fifth Amendment rights.159 What Justice Fortas wrote in 
Gardner seems equally applicable to Chavez: “[T]he mandate of the great 
privilege against self-incrimination does not tolerate the attempt, regardless of 
its ultimate effectiveness, to coerce a waiver of the immunity it confers on 
penalty of the loss of employment.”160 If the privilege prevents government 
officials from attempting to coerce a waiver from city employees, “regardless of 
its ultimate effectiveness,” a fortiori, it should prevent Officer Chavez from 
attempting to coerce an incriminating statement from Martinez. 
Five years after Gardner and Uniformed Sanitation Men, the Court decided 
Lefkowitz v. Turley.161 Two architects licensed by the State of New York “were 
 
OF THE WARREN COURT (1992) (chronicling Justice Harlan’s jurisprudence, and describing 
him throughout his time on the Court as a “great dissenter”). 
153 Spevack, 385 U.S. at 522 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
154 392 U.S. 273 (1968). 
155 392 U.S. 280 (1968). 
156 See Uniformed Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 281-83; Gardner, 392 U.S. at 274-75. 
157 See Uniformed Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 282; Gardner, 392 U.S. at 274-75. 
158 See Uniformed Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 282; Gardner, 392 U.S. at 274-75. 
159 See Uniformed Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 283 (“[The workers] were dismissed for 
invoking and refusing to waive their constitutional right against self-incrimination. They were 
discharged for refusal to expose themselves to criminal prosecution based on testimony which 
they would give under compulsion, despite their constitutional privilege.”); Gardner, 392 
U.S. at 278 (“[Gardner] was discharged from office, not for failure to answer relevant 
questions about his official duties, but for refusal to waive a constitutional right. He was 
dismissed for failure to relinquish the protections of the privilege against self-incrimination.”). 
The Court in Gardner distinguished its facts from Garrity, explaining that Garrity did not 
address the discrete question presented in Gardner, namely “whether a State may discharge 
an officer for refusing to waive a right which the Constitution guarantees to him.” Gardner, 
392 U.S. at 277. 
160 Gardner, 392 U.S. at 277. 
161 414 U.S 70 (1973). 
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summoned to testify before a grand jury investigating [criminal conduct].”162 At 
the grand jury, “[t]hey were asked, but refused, to sign waivers of immunity, the 
effect of which would have been to waive their right not to be compelled in a 
criminal case to be a witness against themselves.”163 As a result of their refusal 
to sign the waiver, any existing contracts the architects had with the State were 
cancelled, and they were disqualified from further transactions with the State for 
five years.164 As in Ardnstein, Spevack, Gardner, and Uniformed Sanitation 
Men, the architects made no incriminating statements and no criminal charges 
were filed against them.165 The architects filed a civil claim alleging that the 
State’s action cancelling their existing and future contracting rights violated the 
Fifth Amendment.166 The Court upheld their claim.167 
Although Justice White perceived “little legal or practical basis” for 
upholding a Fifth Amendment claim in Spevack where a lawyer “incriminated 
himself in no way whatsoever” during a disciplinary proceeding and did not face 
criminal charges,168 in Turley he saw things differently. Justice White’s majority 
opinion explained that the goal of the Fifth Amendment “‘was to insure that a 
person should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, 
to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed a 
crime.’”169 This principle, according to Justice White, “reflected the settled 
view” of the Court.170 Thus, there was “no room for urging that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege is inapplicable simply because the issue arises . . . in the 
context of official inquiries into the job performance of a public contractor.”171 
Nor was the State’s interest in maintaining the integrity of its civil service and 
contracting business enough to override the Fifth Amendment rights of the 
architects.172 Furthermore, even though the architects had made no incriminating 
statements and faced no criminal charges, Justice White explained that the 
rulings in Garrity, Gardner, and Uniformed Sanitation Men controlled.173 When 
the State asked questions that were potentially incriminating, required the waiver 
of the architects’ Fifth Amendment protection, and disqualified the architects as 
 
162 Id. at 75.  
163 Id. at 76. 
164 Id. at 71-72.  
165 Id. at 76. 
166 Id.  
167 Id.  
168 See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 531 (1967) (White, J., dissenting). 
169 Turley, 414 U.S. at 77 (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892)). 
170 Id. (citing McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924)). 
171 Id. at 78. 
172 See id. at 78-79 (noting that “claims of overriding interests are not unusual in Fifth 
Amendment litigation and they have not fared well” (citing Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n 
v. Comm’r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); 
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)). 
173 See id. at 82.  
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public contractors for refusal to sign a waiver, New York officials sought to 
obtain “what Garrity specifically prohibited⎯to compel testimony that had not 
been immunized.”174 
Finally, Justice White saw no merit in the State’s argument that the architects 
had experienced no compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment nor 
suffered a forbidden penalty by being disqualified as public contractors for 
refusing to answer the grand jury’s questions.175 Leaving no doubt about when 
the constitutional violation occurred, Justice White expressly agreed with the 
lower court’s conclusion that “the [architects’] disqualification from public 
contracting for five years as a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege is 
violative of their Fifth Amendment rights.”176 This last point made clear that the 
architects’ Fifth Amendment rights were violated upon imposition of the 
disqualification from public contracting. Their constitutional rights were not 
held in abeyance until some future time when a compelled statement might be 
introduced or used in a criminal case. Just as the architects possessed a present 
right not to be compelled, Martinez possessed the same right while being 
interrogated.177 
Lastly, there is Lefkowitz v. Cunningham,178 which addressed whether a 
political party official could be removed from his position by the State and 
barred for five years from holding any other party or public office because he 
refused to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege when testifying before a grand 
jury.179 Patrick Cunningham refused to waive the privilege when subpoenaed to 
testify before a grand jury that was investigating his conduct in the political 
positions he occupied.180 As in the cases described above, Cunningham made no 
incriminating statements to the grand jury and later faced no criminal charges.181 
As a result of his refusal to waive the privilege, a New York statute mandated 
Cunningham’s immediate removal from his political party offices.182 
Cunningham then filed a civil action and sought injunctive relief against 
 
174 Id.  
175 See id. at 83.  
176 Id. at 83 (emphasis added) (quoting Turley v. Lefkowitz, 342 F. Supp. 544, 549 
(W.D.N.Y. 1972)). 
177  See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 791 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The Clause provides both assurance that a person will not be compelled 
to testify against himself in a criminal proceeding and a continuing right against government 
conduct intended to bring about self-incrimination.” (citing Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973))).  
178 431 U.S. 801 (1977). 
179 See id. at 802-03.  
180 Id. at 803.  
181 Id.  
182 See id. at 803-04.  
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enforcement of the statute on the ground that the law violated his Fifth 
Amendment right.183 The Court upheld his claim.184 
Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion in Cunningham relied upon Garrity, 
Gardner, Uniformed Sanitation Men, and Turley for the established principle 
that Government “cannot penalize assertion of the constitutional privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination by imposing sanctions to compel testimony 
which has not been immunized.”185 The Chief Justice explained that “the 
touchstone of the Fifth Amendment is compulsion, and direct economic 
sanctions and imprisonment are not the only penalties capable of forcing the 
self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids.”186 Chief Justice Burger 
stated that the New York law threatened Cunningham with grave consequences, 
including the loss of positions that carry substantial prestige and political 
influence, solely because he would not relinquish his Fifth Amendment right.187 
Thus, the law was “constitutionally indistinguishable from the coercive 
provisions” invalidated in Gardner, Uniformed Sanitation Men, and Turley.188 
Justice Thomas’s opinion in Chavez proceeds as if these cases are irrelevant 
to the question before the Court.189 For example, Justice Thomas read the text of 
the Fifth Amendment, specifically, the term “criminal case,” to require the 
“initiation of legal proceedings,”190 and explained that police interrogation does 
 
183 Id. at 804.  
184 Id.  
185 Id. at 806. 
186 Id.  
187 See id. at 807.  
188 Id. 
189 Although by no means on all fours with Chavez, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Chavez 
convinces me that McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002), also undermines Justice Thomas’s 
vision of what the Fifth Amendment protects. A Kansas prison rehabilitation program 
required convicted sex offenders to acknowledge their past crimes in order to be eligible to 
participate in the program and enjoy some of the program’s benefits not accorded to other 
prisoners. Id. at 30 (plurality opinion). Robert Lile contended that requiring him to admit his 
past crime violated the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 31. A plurality of the Justices found that 
because the program promotes an important penological goal and offers minimal incentives 
to prisoners to participate, it does not violate the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 47-48. While 
Lile lost his claim, according to his separate opinion in Chavez, Justice Kennedy noted that 
all nine Justices in Lile “proceeded from the premise that a present, completed violation of 
the Self-Incrimination Clause could occur if an incarcerated prisoner were required to admit 
to past crimes on pain of forfeiting certain privileges or being assigned harsher conditions of 
confinement.” Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 793 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); see also Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (plurality opinion); id. at 48 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 54 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In other words, “[n]o Member 
of the [Lile] Court suggested that the absence of a pending criminal proceeding made the Self-
Incrimination Clause inquiry irrelevant.” Chavez, 538 U.S. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).  
190 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 766 (plurality opinion).  
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not constitute a “case” under the Fifth Amendment.191 If police questioning is 
not a “case,” it is not obvious why a grand jury proceeding is one. But after 
Counselman rejected the Government’s argument that a grand jury hearing is 
not a “criminal case” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment,192 why does 
it matter that Justice Thomas believes that police questioning is not a “criminal 
case”? Moreover, why does it matter after Miranda explicitly put to rest the 
notion that the privilege does not apply in the police station or to police 
interrogation generally? As Chief Justice Warren observed: 
 The question in these cases is whether the privilege is fully applicable 
during a period of custodial interrogation. In this Court, the privilege has 
consistently been accorded a liberal construction. We are satisfied that all 
the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal compulsion 
exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning. An 
individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, 
surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of 
persuasion [exerted by police] cannot be otherwise than under compulsion 
to speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated 
setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other 
official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard 
against intimidation or trickery.193 
Put another way, if Miranda left no doubt that the privilege “fully” applies 
during police interrogation, why does it matter, when interpreting the meaning 
of the Fifth Amendment, “that police questioning does not constitute a ‘case’ 
any more than a private investigator’s precomplaint activities constitute a ‘civil 
case’”?194 Indeed, over fifty years ago, the federal government told the Court: 
 It has long been recognized . . . that the policies underlying the privilege 
may be violated by informal compulsion exerted by a law-enforcement 
officer acting under color of authority. We have no doubt therefore, that it 
is possible for a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right to be violated during in-
custody questioning by a law-enforcement officer.195 
 
191 See id. at 767. Justice Souter’s separate opinion in Chavez did not address or attempt to 
define when a “criminal case” begins for determining when a compelled statement is used 
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 
192 See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892); supra notes 120-24 and 
accompanying text.  
193 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460-61 (1966) (citations omitted).  
194 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767 (plurality opinion).  
195 Brief of Respondent at 28, Westover v. United States, No. 761, consolidated, Miranda 
v. Arizona, 386 U.S. 436 (1966); see also Brief of Respondent at 40-41 n.44, Anderson v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 350 (1943) (No. 10-513) (“Logically and practically there is no real 
difference between torture in the courtroom to compel a witness to testify and torture outside 
to obtain a confession to read at the trial. The scope of the privilege is not to be limited by 
technical notions of the scope of a ‘criminal case’ but ‘is as broad as the mischief against 
which it seeks to guard.’” (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892) 
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In any event, the above cases⎯Garrity, Spevack, Gardner, Uniformed 
Sanitation Men, Turley, and Cunningham⎯clearly show that the Warren and 
Burger Courts believed that the “initiation of legal proceedings” was not 
required to trigger Fifth Amendment protection. Not only were there no 
“criminal cases” in Spevack, Gardner, Uniformed Sanitation Men, Turley, and 
Cunningham, there were no incriminating statements that could be used in a 
criminal prosecution, if such a prosecution had been initiated. Nonetheless, the 
Court in each of these cases concluded that the Fifth Amendment was violated. 
In addition, these cases also show what Justice Thomas insisted the text of the 
amendment does not authorize, namely, government compulsion to induce 
incriminating admissions violates the Fifth Amendment. To reiterate, these 
rulings demonstrate that even when no incriminating statements were obtained 
and no subsequent criminal charges were filed, the Fifth Amendment “does not 
tolerate the attempt, regardless of its ultimate effectiveness,” to coerce self-
incrimination.196 
Justice Thomas’s opinion never discusses the holdings of these cases. Only in 
a footnote does he get close to acknowledging part of the holdings of Uniformed 
Sanitation Men and Turley when he writes that the Government may not 
“penalize public employees and government contractors to induce them to waive 
their immunity from the use of their compelled statements in subsequent criminal 
proceedings.”197 But he couples that description with the assertion that 
“immunity is not itself a right secured by the text of the Self-Incrimination 
Clause, but rather a prophylactic rule we have constructed to protect the Fifth 
Amendment’s right from invasion.”198 
Justice Thomas’s statement that immunity is not a textual right is true, but 
utterly unhelpful. Whatever one thinks of the use of prophylactic rules in 
constitutional decision-making,199 my reading of Garrity, Spevack, Gardner, 
 
(citations omitted))). 
196 Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 279 (1968); cf. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 
531 (1967) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s ruling is based on the premise that 
“it is an essential measure to protect against self-incrimination⎯to prevent what may well be 
a successful attempt to elicit incriminating admissions”). 
197 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 768 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n v. Comm’r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); 
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973)). 
198 Id.  
199 Compare JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 173-98 (1993) 
(recognizing that the text of the Constitution cannot address all issues that will arise in 
constitutional litigation, but arguing that the prophylactic rules announced in Miranda were 
illegitimate), and Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of 
Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100, 105-06, 123-47 (1985) (questioning the 
legitimacy of prophylactic rules generally, and arguing that Miranda’s prophylactic were 
plainly illegitimate), with David A. Strauss, Miranda, The Constitution, and Congress, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 958, 960 (2001) (contending that “constitutional rules⎯routinely, 
unavoidably, and quite properly⎯treat ‘the Constitution itself’ as requiring ‘prophylaxis’”), 
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Uniformed Sanitation Men, Turley, and Cunningham convinces me that the 
Court believed it was applying the real Fifth Amendment. There is no indication 
in any of these cases that the Court thought it was enforcing some judge-made 
or “prophylactic” rule. Thus, Justice Thomas proffers revisionist analysis when 
he suggests that these cases do not enforce “a constitutional right.”200 As the 
above discussion demonstrates, the Court was enforcing the Fifth Amendment 
in each of these cases. 
And as far as immunity is concerned, what is the point of asserting that 
immunity is not mentioned in the text of the amendment, but instead is a judge-
made rule? This is true, but why does it matter in Chavez where the target of the 
Government’s compulsion was never given immunity for his compelled 
statements? More pertinent, because he believes that immunity is not a 
constitutional right, Justice Thomas contended that Martinez’s ignorance that 
his compelled statements could not be used at a criminal trial was 
constitutionally irrelevant. Justice Thomas’s view of the constitutional 
significance of immunity is dead wrong. In each of the cases discussed above, 
the witness does not have immunity, and thus, her Fifth Amendment rights are 
violated because she cannot be compelled to answer without this safeguard 
against later use. In Gardner and Uniformed Sanitation Men, for example, the 
police officer’s and sanitation employees’ Fifth Amendment rights were violated 
because they were dismissed from their jobs after refusing to waive their Fifth 
Amendment right without the protection of immunity. In contrast, the Court 
found in Brown that compelling a witness to speak with the grant of immunity 
would not violate the Fifth Amendment.201 Time and again, the Court has 
recognized that without immunity to assure a witness that her statement cannot 
be used against her in a criminal case, she cannot be compelled to answer without 
violating her Fifth Amendment rights. 
This was precisely the situation Martinez faced. As he lay in a hospital 
receiving treatment for gunshot wounds related to the recent officer-involved 
shooting, Martinez was interrogated by Officer Chavez without receiving 
Miranda warnings. Despite clearly and repeatedly telling Officer Chavez that he 
did not want to answer any questions about the shooting, Officer Chavez 
continued to question Martinez. Eventually, Martinez made incriminating 
statements. Martinez was not granted immunity. It follows, bearing in mind 
 
and David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190-95, 
207-09 (1988) (arguing that prophylactic rules announced by the Court are not only 
legitimate, but are a “central and necessary” component of constitutional decision-making). 
200 See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 772 (plurality opinion) (“Rules designed to safeguard a 
constitutional right, however, do not extend the scope of the constitutional right itself, just as 
violations of judicially crafted prophylactic rules do not violate the constitutional rights of 
any person. As we explained, we have allowed the Fifth Amendment privilege to be asserted 
by witnesses in noncriminal cases in order to safeguard the core constitutional right defined 
by the Self-Incrimination Clause⎯the right not to be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against oneself.”). 
201 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 610 (1896).  
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Arndstein, Spevack, and the entire line of cases Justice Thomas overlooks, that 
Martinez could not be compelled to speak without this assurance of immunity. 
To paraphrase Justice White’s opinion in Turley, Officer Chavez sought to 
obtain what the Court’s precedents barred—“to compel testimony that had not 
been immunized.”202 It does not matter where the witness is when she is 
compelled to speak, be it a grand jury proceeding, bankruptcy hearing, hospital, 
or police interrogation room. Unless the witness knows that the compelled 
statement cannot be used against him—unless he has been granted immunity—
he cannot be compelled to answer. Put differently, if the witness does not know 
that his statements cannot be used against him later in a criminal case, his Fifth 
Amendment right is presently violated. Each of these cases demonstrate this 
proposition and Justice Thomas declined to see this as a compelling, 
distinguishing factor.203 Justice Thomas’s opinion departs from this very long 
and consistent line of precedents. 
A century of Fifth Amendment doctrine establishes that the privilege and 
immunity (either judicial or legislative) work together to produce the same 
result. As noted many years ago, “[i]t is accepted that the privilege against self-
incrimination includes some degree of immunity from use of testimony procured 
in violation of the privilege.”204 Justice Black put it nicely when he noted “a 
witness does not need any [immunity] statute to protect him from the use of self-
incriminating testimony he is compelled to give over his objection. The Fifth 
Amendment takes care of that without a statute.”205 Perhaps, that is why the 
Court has recognized that immunity statutes “have ‘become part of our 
constitutional fabric.’”206 Because the Fifth Amendment itself demands some 
form of immunity, either by statute or court action in the form of a suppression 
order or reversal of a conviction obtained with the use of compelled testimony, 
Justice Thomas’s description of immunity is not only incorrect, it is unhelpful 
and adds nothing to the constitutional analysis in Chavez.207 
 
202 Turley, 414 U.S. at 82. 
203 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.  
204 McKay, supra note 7, at 231. 
205 Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 181 (1954). 
206 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 447 (1972) (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 
350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956)).  
207 Dershowitz writes that “Justice Thomas’s narrow reading of the text of the privilege 
seems to support the conclusion that immunity is not constitutionally required before a witness 
can be compelled to answer self-incriminating questions.” DERSHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 47 
(emphasis added). Dershowitz explains why: 
In a civil case or a legislative hearing, there is no textual prohibition against compelling 
testimony. And since compelled or coerced testimony, according to Thomas, will be 
“automatically” excluded from “any criminal case” in which the person is a defendant, 
it would seem to follow that a formal grant of immunity should no longer be required as 
a prerequisite for imprisoning a witness who refuses to answer self-incriminating 
questions. 
Id. at 47-48. Carolyn Frantz appears to share Dershowitz’s view that, after Chavez, immunity 
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PART III 
Despite the disputed and elusive nature of the history of the Fifth Amendment, 
little controversy is raised by claiming that at the time of the Framing, the Fifth 
Amendment was intended “to prohibit improper methods of interrogation.”208 
 
may no longer be a prerequisite in order to compel incriminating statements in noncriminal 
proceedings. According to Frantz, Chavez’s understanding of the Fifth Amendment: 
ought to change practice in at least one very significant respect: the Court ought to allow 
testimony to be compelled in noncriminal proceedings, and wait to use the suppression 
remedy to address whatever problems arise in the criminal trial. This change of practice 
would alter the privilege’s role in a variety of contexts. Essentially, government actors 
could compel individuals to make incriminating statements, so long as they were willing 
to risk having to forgo use of that evidence and its fruits in a subsequent criminal trial. 
Of course, they may do this now, but only if they explicitly grant up-front immunity. The 
new understanding of the privilege would seem to remove that requirement. 
Carolyn J. Frantz, Chavez v. Martinez’s Constitutional Division of Labor, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 
269, 288. 
Although I agree with Dershowitz’s criticism of Justice Thomas’s interpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment, I doubt that the Court is ready to adopt the view that a formal grant of immunity 
is no longer required before imprisoning a witness who refuses to provide self-incriminating 
admissions. The Court has made it clear that while the government can compel self-
incriminatory statements, it must provide immunity commensurate with the privilege to 
satisfy the Constitution. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S 70, 85 (1973) (“[I]f answers are to 
be required [by a state contractor subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury] States must offer 
to the witness whatever immunity is required to supplant the privilege and may not insist that 
the employee or contractor waive such immunity.”); Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461 (“The privilege 
assures that a citizen is not compelled to incriminate himself by his own testimony. It usually 
operates to allow a citizen to remain silent when asked a question requiring an incriminatory 
answer. This [federal immunity] statute, which operates after a witness has given 
incriminatory testimony, affords the same protection by assuring that the compelled testimony 
can in no way lead to the infliction of criminal penalties.”); Ullmann v. United States, 350 
U.S. 422, 439 (1956) (“Immunity displaces the danger. Once the reason for the privilege 
ceases, the privilege ceases.”); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 610 (1896) (“While the [Fifth 
Amendment] is justly regarded as one of the most valuable prerogatives of the citizen, its 
object is fully accomplished by the statutory immunity, and we are, therefore, of opinion that 
the witness was compellable to answer . . . .”). Imprisoning a person for refusing to testify 
without an immunity grant would violate the Fifth Amendment because imprisonment would 
be a penalty equal to, if not greater than, the penalties suffered by Spevack, Gardner, the 
sanitation workers, Turley, and Cunningham. 
208 Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective, in HELMHOLZ ET 
AL., supra note 91, at 181, 185. In an influential article, Alschuler summarizes what the Fifth 
Amendment protected during the Framing era: 
The Fifth Amendment privilege prohibited (1) incriminating interrogation under oath, 
(2) torture, and (3) probably other forms of coercive interrogation such as threats of 
future punishment and promises of leniency. The Amendment prohibited nothing more, 
or at least the sources mention nothing more. The Self-Incrimination Clause neither 
mandated an accusatorial system nor afforded defendants a right to remain silent. It 
focused upon improper methods of gaining information from criminal suspects. 
Alschuler, supra note 94, at 2651-52 (footnotes omitted).   
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Under today’s legal standards,209 Officer Chavez subjected Oliverio Martinez to 
an improper method of interrogation; he used coercion to induce incriminating 
statements that Martinez might have reasonably believed “could be used in a 
criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used.”210 
Under the Court’s precedents, Officer Chavez’s methods were sufficient to 
establish a violation of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Thomas has indicated that 
the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment is important when deciding 
today’s cases.211 Ironically, in Chavez, he paid no attention to the fact that, 
viewed from the Framers’ perspective, the Fifth Amendment focused on 
improper methods of securing information from criminal suspects.212 Instead, 
Justice Thomas employed a literal reading of the text to conclude that Martinez 
had not stated a claim under the Fifth Amendment. There are multiple reasons 
why the Court rejected a literal interpretation of the Fifth Amendment over a 
century ago. The meaning of the text is far from clear; as written, the privilege 
is susceptible to differing interpretations. Moreover, the bare terms of the 
privilege “yield[] to no convenient formula.”213 Even Justice Harlan, a model 
Supreme Court Justice for many conservatives, recognized the text cannot and 
should not control how the Court interprets the Fifth Amendment.214 Certainly, 
the members of the Chavez plurality understood that the Court’s precedents have 
 
209 I agree with Alschuler’s judgment that our legal system and institutions are starkly 
different from what the Framers lived under. Thus, “restoring the original understanding of 
the Fifth Amendment privilege is impossible.” Alschuler, supra note 94, at 2667. Likewise, 
“[t]he history of the privilege against self-incrimination provides only limited guidance in 
resolving the Fifth Amendment issues that confront modern courts.” Id. at 2669. Finally, when 
considering what influence the original understanding of the Fifth Amendment should have 
when resolving modern legal controversies, it is important to recall that “[n]othing closely 
resembling stationhouse interrogation occurred at the time of the Fifth Amendment’s 
framing.” Id.; cf. John Fabian Witt, Making the Fifth: The Constitutionalization of American 
Self-Incrimination Doctrine, 1791-1903, 77 TEX. L. REV. 825, 831 (1999) (“Crossing the 
bridge between historical analysis and doctrinal reasoning can be a risky venture; changes in 
institutions, practices, and surrounding legal rules make most moves from historical narrative 
to contemporary legal interpretation exceedingly complicated. Thus, the history of a doctrine 
can rarely, if ever, be relied on to lead to determinate conclusions about contemporary legal 
questions.”). 
210 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 445. 
211 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring); supra 
note 93 and accompanying text.  
212 See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.  
213 McKay, supra note 7, at 194.  
214 See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 522 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting); supra note 153 
and accompanying text. In another case, Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955), Justice 
Harlan stated: “A valid claim of privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment has two requisites: (1) the privilege must be adequately invoked, and (2) a 
possible answer to the question against which the privilege is asserted must have some 
tendency to incriminate the person to whom the question is addressed,” id. at 203 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). Martinez satisfied both requisites. 
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repeatedly rejected a literal reading of the privilege to determine the scope and 
meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause.215 
What then, explains the reasoning behind Chavez? Perhaps members of the 
Court worried that recognizing a claim for Martinez would allow terrorist 
suspects, subjected to harsh and brutal interrogation techniques by government 
officials, to bring lawsuits in federal court.216 While that concern may explain 
some of the motivation behind the result in Chavez, I submit that the reasoning 
of Chavez is propelled by a different and larger objective. The six Justices who 
denied Martinez’s claim view the Fifth Amendment as a prophylactic protection, 
and not a substantive constitutional right. I believe these Justices were 
persuaded, in part, by the Solicitor General’s argument that the Fifth 
Amendment does not control the actions of police officers.217 If the Fifth 
Amendment does not control the conduct of officers in the field, then the 
privilege does not bar the use of coercion to obtain a confession in every context, 
but rather merely controls the use of statements in the courtroom. That is why 
the Deputy Solicitor General told the Justices “the self-incrimination privilege 
is unusual because it’s not purely and simply binding on the government. It 
doesn’t say that in all contexts, the government cannot coerce confessions.”218 
Under this logic, a coerced confession becomes constitutionally problematic 
only when it is used in a criminal trial to help convict a person. If a compelled 
statement is introduced or used at a criminal trial, the judiciary can intervene to 
protect the values underlying the privilege by ordering suppression of the 
statement, or reversing the conviction. Thus, the Fifth Amendment does not 
provide a substantive right against government compulsion to induce 
incriminating disclosures; rather, it is a prophylactic. This understanding, I 
believe, explains Justice Thomas’s statement that “the privilege is a prophylactic 
one,”219 and Justice Souter’s understanding that the Court is free to expand vel 
non the “core of Fifth Amendment protection” depending on whether the 
claimant has made a persuasive case.220 
Of course, this view of the Fifth Amendment has disturbing consequences. As 
recognized by Justice Breyer during the oral argument in Chavez, when the Fifth 
Amendment is construed as merely prophylactic, there will be scenarios where 
significant harm is incurred, but there is no constitutional basis for judicial 
 
215 See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text. 
216 See Parry, supra note 22, at 838 (“Concerns about terrorism, unstated in the opinions 
but on display in the briefs, feed the uncertainty of the middle and strengthen the hand of the 
justices who would narrow the privilege and limit the scope of substantive due process.”). 
217 See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.  
218 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 20.  
219 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 n.3 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
220 See id. at 777-78 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); cf. Frantz, supra note 207, at 
281 (stating Justice Thomas’s and Justice Souter’s opinions in Chavez recharacterized prior 
Fifth Amendment “decisions as mere prophylactic protections for the privilege, rather than as 
applications of the privilege itself”). 
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intervention because under the reasoning of Chavez there has been no 
constitutional injury.221 Imagine, for example, police violate the Fifth 
Amendment by not giving Miranda warnings or by employing psychological 
coercion to obtain a confession from an innocent suspect. State officials then use 
the confession in a grand jury proceeding to indict this suspect, use the 
confession to deny bail, and use the confession at a pretrial hearing to determine 
whether the suspect should be tried in juvenile or adult court.222 In such a 
scenario, as Justice Breyer recognized, a person might be detained before trial 
“in jail for a week or a month and he’s been hurt, all right.”223 But, if criminal 
charges are later dismissed, one can argue that the innocent suspect has suffered 
no Fifth Amendment violation because his compelled statement was never used 
in a courtroom setting.224 Moreover, interpreting the Fifth Amendment as a 
prophylactic does nothing for the person envisioned in Justice Kennedy’s 
hypotheticals presented at the beginning of this Article.225 Physically abusing a 
suspect to obtain a confession—or a judge’s order in a civil case holding a 
witness, who asserts a valid Fifth Amendment privilege, in contempt and 
confined until the witness testifies—involves no Fifth Amendment violation 
under the logic of Chavez.226 During the oral argument in Chavez, Justice Breyer 
 
221 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 22-23 (“But there are a set of cases 
where it will hurt people. The set of cases where it will hurt people is where because [the 
police] violated Miranda but didn’t beat him up, and got a statement, they kept him jail. . . . 
So there he is in jail for a week or a month and he’s been hurt, all right.”). 
222 See Crowe v. Cty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 425 (9th Cir. 2010). 
223 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 23.  
224 See, e.g., Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental trial right which can be violated only at 
trial, even though pre-trial conduct by law enforcement officials may ultimately impair that 
right.” (citing Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767 (plurality opinion)); Renda v. King 347 F.3d. 550, 559 
(3d Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is the use of coerced statements during a criminal trial, and not in 
obtaining an indictment, that violates the Constitution.”). But see Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 
F.3d 910, 924 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Where . . . a suspect’s criminal prosecution was not only 
initiated, but was commenced because of her allegedly unwarned confession, the ‘criminal 
case’ contemplated by the Self-Incrimination Clause has begun.” (quoting Sornberger v. City 
of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2006)); Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 
173 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that “[arrestee’s] initial appearance . . . was part of the criminal 
case against [him]”). 
225 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
226 When posing this latter hypothetical, Justice Kennedy may have been thinking about 
Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975). In Maness, the Court addressed whether in a civil 
hearing a lawyer may be held in contempt for advising his client in good faith not to produce 
subpoenaed materials (allegedly obscene magazines) on the ground that the materials may 
incriminate the client. Id. at 458. The Court ruled that the lawyer may not be penalized even 
though his advice caused the client to disobey the court’s order. Id. at 465-66. The Maness 
Court explained that the Fifth Amendment “would be drained of its meaning” if a lawyer 
“could be penalized for advising his client in good faith to assert it.” Id. Although the lawyer’s 
client was also held in contempt and fined for refusing to produce the court-ordered materials, 
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seemed worried that the result in Chavez would also decide these hypothetical 
cases.227 Breyer was correct; Chavez’s logic means that no Fifth Amendment 
violation occurred in these scenarios. 
Although reading the Fifth Amendment as a prophylactic (rather than a 
constitutional right) entails the harm described above, from another perspective, 
interpreting the Fifth Amendment as merely prophylactic means that the Court 
can “rein in the privilege by transforming large parts of current doctrine into 
prophylactic rules that may be subject to congressional override”228 or judicial 
overruling.229 Ultimately, I believe, the aim of Justice Thomas’s opinion was to 
reshape Fifth Amendment doctrine. Other scholars have recognized that the 
reasoning of Chavez can significantly influence how the privilege is interpreted 
in future cases.230 While Justices Thomas and Souter insisted that precedent 
commanded their interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, this is incorrect. The 
reasoning of the six Justices “enunciates a new approach with real implications 
 
the Court in Maness did not address the validity of the contempt penalty imposed on the client. 
Id. at 455 n.5. Justice Kennedy’s hypothetical poses the issue left open in Maness: Would 
holding a witness in a civil case—who has a valid Fifth Amendment privilege—in contempt 
and confined until the witness testifies, violate the Fifth Amendment? 
227 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 23 (“I don’t know if we should⎯it 
seems to me what we’re going to decide in this case is effectively going to decide that.”). 
228 Parry, supra note 22, at 837. 
229 See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009). The Court overruled Michigan v. 
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), in Montejo, 556 U.S. at 797. Jackson had ruled that, under the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, police are barred from initiating interrogation of a criminal 
defendant once he has requested counsel at an arraignment. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636. The 
Jackson Court essentially applied its prior ruling in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), 
to the Sixth Amendment context. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636. In Edwards, a Fifth 
Amendment case, the Court ruled that under Miranda, police are forbidden from initiating 
questioning of an arrestee after the arrestee has invoked his right to counsel during custodial 
interrogation. Id. at 484-85. A later case, Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990), 
extended the Edwards rule to scenarios where an arrestee had actually consulted with counsel, 
id. at 151-52. In explaining why Jackson should be overruled, Justice Scalia, the author of 
Montejo, noted the “prophylactic protection” provided by Miranda, Edwards, and Minnick, 
and stated that “[t]hese three layers of prophylaxis are sufficient” to protect the constitutional 
rights of persons subjected to police interrogation. Montejo, 556 U.S. at 794-95.  
230 See, e.g., Frantz, supra note 207, at 279-80 (“By focusing the privilege on the use at 
trial of compelled statements at trial, Chavez has a potentially significant impact on the 
privilege.”); cf. Marvin Zalman, Reading the Tea Leaves of Chavez v. Martinez: The Future 
of Miranda, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 299, 332 (2004) (“A closer examination of Chavez discloses 
fault lines in the Court’s understanding of the Fifth Amendment privilege that will 
undoubtedly come into play in its [then] anticipated decisions in Seibert and Patane.”); 
Geoffrey B. Fehling, Note, Verdugo, Where’d You Go?: Stoot v. City of Everett and 
Evaluating Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Civil Liability Violations, 18 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 481, 484 (2011) (“The aftermath of Chavez is unclear, leaving courts to attempt to 
protect the Fifth Amendment’s constitutional guarantees without exercising too much 
discretion in interpreting the scope of constitutional rights.” (footnote omitted)). 
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for the future.”231 Justice Thomas in particular has not been afraid to take bold 
steps in order to change constitutional doctrine, especially constitutional rules 
announced by whom he perceived to be liberal Justices. According to one report, 
“Thomas is laying the ground work for opinions that may be outliers now, but 
could plant seeds for the future.”232 But, as demonstrated within a year of the 
Court’s decision, Chavez is no outlier. 
In United States v. Patane,233 Justice Thomas relied on Chavez to reverse a 
ruling requiring suppression of a gun found after a suspect, who had been 
arrested and interrogated without the provision of Miranda warnings, and 
incriminated himself during the interrogation.234 Justice Thomas wrote for a 
plurality of the Court in Patane when he explained that “a mere failure to give 
Miranda warnings does not, by itself, violate a suspect’s constitutional rights or 
even the Miranda rule.”235 According to Justice Thomas, it follows from this 
proposition that police do not violate the Fifth Amendment or Miranda by 
negligent or even deliberate failures to provide Miranda warnings: “Potential 
violations occur, if at all, only upon the admission of unwarned statements into 
evidence at trial. And, at that point, ‘[t]he exclusion of unwarned 
statements . . . is a complete and sufficient remedy’ for any perceived Miranda 
violation.”236 What case supports this understanding of Fifth Amendment law? 
 
231 Frantz, supra note 207, at 280. 
232 Ariane de Vogue, Clarence Thomas’ Supreme Court Legacy, CNN: POLITICS (Oct. 22, 
2016, 10:06 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/22/politics/clarence-thomas-supreme-court-
25-years/ [https://perma.cc/36HQ-QCTF]. This same story quotes Ken Blackwell and Ken 
Klukowski, two conservative pundits, stating that “Justice Thomas is writing for history.” Id.  
233 542 U.S. 630 (2004).  
234 Id. at 634-35 (plurality opinion). 
235 Id. at 641. Of course, after years of stating that Miranda was merely a prophylactic rule 
and not required by the Constitution, in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), the 
Court disavowed these statements and held that Miranda “announced a constitutional rule,” 
and thus, could not be overturned by a congressional statute, id. at 444. As one observer has 
noted, although the Dickerson dissenters (Justices Scalia and Thomas) conceded that 
characterizing or viewing the Miranda doctrine as prophylactic “might have rendered 
Miranda jurisprudence coherent, they rejoiced in the Court’s failure to rely on it because, 
believing that such prophylaxis was an ‘immense and frightening antidemocratic power [that] 
does not exist,’ they suggested that ‘incoherence [might be] the lesser evil.’” The Supreme 
Court, 2003 Term—Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV. 248, 301 (2004) (alterations in 
original). In Patane, Justice Thomas stated “the Miranda rule is a prophylactic employed to 
protect against violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause.” Patane, 542 U.S. at 636. Thus, 
“Patane revealed that the Dickerson dissenters, eschewing their own rhetoric that 
‘incoherence [might be] the lesser evil,’ have fulfilled their own prophecy.” The Supreme 
Court, 2003 Term—Leading Cases, supra, at 301 (footnote omitted). For a meticulous critique 
of Patane, see Yale Kamisar, Tribute, Postscript: Another Look at Patane and Seibert, the 
2004 Miranda “Poisoned Fruit” Cases, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 97 (2004). 
236 Patane, 542 U.S. at 641-42 (alteration in original) (quoting Chavez v. Martinez, 538 
U.S. 760, 790 (2003)). 
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Justice Thomas cites Chavez. The future will reveal what further impact Chavez 
will have on the Fifth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
Considering the Self-Incrimination Clause, then-Chief Judge Magruder of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit wrote, “[o]ur forefathers, 
when they wrote this provision into the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, 
had in mind a lot of history which has been largely forgotten to-day.”237 In 
Chavez, not only did Justice Thomas ignore “a lot of history,” he also failed to 
heed the admonition that “the history of the privilege establishes . . . that it is not 
to be interpreted literally.”238 Justice Thomas had other concerns. The history of 
the Fifth Amendment and the Court’s precedents were obstacles to Justice 
Thomas’s goal of transforming the Self-Incrimination Clause from a substantive 
right into a judge-made prophylactic rule. When Justice Stevens complained that 
Justice Thomas’s opinion was “fundamentally flawed” because “it incorrectly 
assumes that coercive interrogation is not unconstitutional when it occurs 
because it merely violates a judge-made ‘prophylactic’ rule,”239 Justice Thomas 
offered no rebuttal. Perhaps, Justice Thomas’s silence to this complaint suggests 
that Justice Stevens correctly diagnosed what Justice Thomas was doing: 
transforming the Self-Incrimination Clause from a substantive right into a judge-
made prophylactic rule. 
 
 
237 Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1954). 
238 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956). 
239 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 788-89 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
